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A judicial storm? Shayara Bano and the issue of triple talak 
Shayara Bano is now one of the most famous Muslim women in India. 
In the span of just a couple of weeks, her life has been the subject of 
numerous articles, blog posts, and other opinion pieces flooding the 
different Indian media outlets.2 Her story is indeed a compelling one. 
Coming from a relatively poor background in Uttarakhand, she married 
Rizwan Ahmad in 2002 according to Muslim Personal Law (MPL), her 
family providing a significant dowry to seal the union. However, the 
marriage was not a happy one and upon her account she soon faced 
acts of cruelty on the part of her husband and his family, including 
persistent demands for an extra dowry and being subjected to physical 
abuse, notably forced abortions. After sending her back to her 
relatives, Rizwan Ahmad finally divorced her by way of triple talak in 
October 2015. 
This type of divorce, unilateral and irrevocable, initiated by the hus-
band (talak al-ba᾿in), through the 'improper' or 'sinful' mode (talak al-
bid῾a) consisting of three consecutive pronouncements, otherwise 
known as 'triple talak', has been a contentious issue within the admi-
nistration of MPL in India. Although it has been criticised by the judi-
ciary in the past3, it has nonetheless never been abolished, and has 
become over the last decade a symbol of intra-communal oppression 
directed at Muslim women against their individual human rights, albeit 
in the name of religious freedom. It has also been used as an argu-
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ment for the establishment of a Uniform Civil Code (UCC), which the 
Constitution of India enjoins the State to promulgate4, and which 
would effectively repeal all personal laws. 
As renowned Muslim women activist and scholar Flavia Agnes points 
out however, MPL may not be the sole responsible for Shayara Bano’s 
tragic position, and as a victim of domestic violence, a number of secu-
lar legislations are available to Muslim women faced with cruel treat-
ment within their marriage, first amongst which the Protection of 
Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.5 Notwithstanding, in her 
petition in front of the Supreme Court of India6, Shayara Bano asks the 
Court to remedy her situation solely in regards to MPL, by issuing writs 
in the nature of mandamus7 declaring her divorce void ab initio, and 
more largely the practices of triple talak, halala8 and polygamy uncon-
stitutional as violative of one’s fundamental rights.9 
Interestingly, the constitutional nature of the petition—even though 
recourse of statutory legislation was available in the lower courts—as 
well as the absence of reference to the UCC render this case somewhat 
singular. Indeed, Shayara Bano’s petition follows a previous decision 
from the Supreme Court in 2015, which had already taken suo motu 
jurisdiction over this very issue as a matter of Public Interest Litigation 
(PIL), whilst settling a string of cases relating to Hindu succession 
law.10 In writing the judgment and submitting the PIL for registration, 
Goel J. similarly does not mention the UCC, but insists on the recourse 
to art. 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution of India in relation to Muslim 
Personal Law, notably citing the Danial Latifi case which had previously 
settled the issue of post-divorce maintenance amongst Muslims.11 
Hence, whilst the Supreme Court admittedly had already decided to 
take up the constitutional validity of triple talak amongst other issues, 
Shayara Bano’s petition brings about a narrative likely to give popular 
support to any change in the administration of MPL in India.  
The timing is strangely fitting, and as Flavia Agnes implicitly sug-
gests might more suit an overarching judicial agenda rather than 
Shayara Bano’s own problems (Agnes 2016), putting her at risk of per-
haps unwillingly becoming the symbol of MPL’s demise, much like Shah 
Bano Begum some 30 years ago.12 Indeed, this case comes at a speci-
fic point in time within the Indian judiciary’s own evolution on the 
question of MPL in general and triple talak in particular.  
As aforementioned, it is a common misperception to consider the 
application of Islamic law in India to be one of taklid (to follow prece-
dent, precluding new interpretation), leaving but little room for reform, 
 



































innovation or mitigation through overarching secular provisions. Unlike 
other Muslim populated states, and most notably neighbouring Paki-
stan, India has never enacted some sort of codified interpretation of 
Islamic family law.13 On the contrary, it followed the legacy of the Raj 
in up-holding an un-codified system of Muslim Personal Law applicable 
to family matters through the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat App-
lication) Act, 1937. This can be explained mainly through the peculi-
arity of the Muslim community’s demographic position in India, which 
albeit strong of approximately 172 million souls14 remains a minority. 
It had been Nehru’s position (consistently up-held until today) "of not 
giving the impression that a Hindu majority was enforcing anything on 
the Muslim minority" (Zachariah 2004: 263-4), which therefore led to 
the view of a "fossilisation of that category of 'personal law'" (ibid.: 
264). 
As such, if Hindu law has been the object of multiple legislation 
following independence, notably in regard to marriage, divorce (Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955) and inheritance (Hindu Succession Act, 1956, 
amended in 2005 towards complete equality between sons and 
daughters)—often referred to as the 'Hindu Code Bill'—subsequent 
attempts to reform MPL, especially through the judiciary, have been 
met with uproar15, and particular legislative enactments have been 
careful to keep in line with the traditional Islamic legal frame.16 This 
apparent 'fossilisation' of Islamic law in India has led commentators to 
push towards either its abrogation altogether17, its submission to fun-
damental rights as provided by the Constitution of India18, or its adap-
tation to local practices (῾adat) through a praxiological approach rather 
than a state—Hindu majority—led initiative. 
Within this context, the practice of triple talak has been at the cen-
tre of intense scrutiny and criticism over the last decades. It is evident 
that such a disposition has engendered quite a lot of controversy in 
regards to its compatibility with the fundamental right to equality or to 
life, as well as creating distortions with other communities on the same 
ground.19 At the same time, how can the Indian state reform MPL with-
out infringing on another fundamental right (namely the one relating 
to freedom of religion and for a community to manage its religious 
affairs according to its own law), whilst risking being perceived as poli-
tically led by a Hindu agenda? 
This conundrum has been tackled by the Indian judiciary on several 
occasions, but also left it divided as to both its solution and the legal 
argumentation that would support it. It appeared however to have 
 



































been definitely decided in 2002 through the Shamim Ara case20, whe-
reby triple talak was deemed to contravene to the tenets of Islamic 
law, which on the other hand required both a valid reason and an arbi-
tration between the spouses to take place before any divorce could be 
legally effective. Considered as a landmark judgment, Narendra Subra-
manian (2008) was however keen to point out the vagueness of these 
conditions. With hindsight it indeed seems Shamim Ara has brought 
more questions than answers on this particular issue, symbolising even 
more the un-ease of the state judiciary in dealing with Muslim personal 
legal matters.     
Notwithstanding, a solution to this quagmire has perhaps recently 
surfaced within the appropriation of such issues at the brink of India’s 
legal landscape, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The latter has 
indeed a peculiar position within the Indian Union, which is one of 
associated sovereignty rather than of direct incorporation.21 Moreover, 
it is the most important state to be populated by a majority of Mus-
lims. As Tahir Mahmood noted, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has a parti-
cular legitimacy in influencing the interpretation of Muslim law, due to 
its unique institutional and demographic positions: 
We venture to suggest that all the organs of the state of Jammu 
and Kashmir, especially the legislature and the judiciary, must 
discharge their sacred obligations in removing the grotesque dis-
tortions of the principles of Muslim personal law from which at 
present the application, administration and general understanding 
of that law vehemently suffers in the state and elsewhere in the 
country. (Mahmood 1981: 281) 
Indeed, since the enactment of the J&K Muslim Personal Law 
(Shariat Application) Act, 200722, J&K has started to directly tackle 
Islamic legal issues, and on the contention regarding triple talak, a 
recent judgment by its High Court23 hints at sustained and possible 
development in the broader field of Muslim Personal Law. Could this 
development now be extended to the entire Indian Union? 
Without predicting the outcome of the pending Shayara Bano case, 
this article seeks to present the aforementioned evolution from a legal 
historical perspective. It focuses particularly on the development of the 
legal argumentation revolving around the administration of MPL and its 
place within the Indian constitutional order. It highlights the conun-
drum the Indian judiciary faced in administering a minority law within 
a sometimes explosive political context, and how it managed to do so 
by gradually putting forward a harmonious interpretation between Isla-
 



































mic law and constitutional fundamental rights provisions, whilst 
moving away from the British colonial legal legacy. It finally stresses 
the importance of Jammu and Kashmir’s High Court in giving the 
necessary impetus and legitimacy to this change in legal reasoning. 
Hence, the fact that T.S. Thakur—current Chief Justice of India—has 
made most of his career in J&K might not be totally coincidental with 
the timing of Shayara Bano’s petition. 
The 'Hands Off' approach and the British colonial legal legacy 
An 'Hands Off' approach does not necessarily imply that the British did 
not change substantively the content of Islamic law in India, quite the 
contrary in fact (Anderson 1995; Giunchi 2010). However, in regards 
to triple talak, one can stress that in doing so, they did not venture 
into re-interpreting or even directly applying Islamic primary sources 
(be it the kurʾan or hadith) but rather heavily—if not exclusively—
relied on what they deemed to be authoritative Indian sources in the 
field, namely Al-Hidaya and Al-Fatawa al-ʿAlamgiriyya.24 Hence British 
judges for the most part only applied a text-book version of Islamic 
law, seasoned with a clear utilitarian/positivist oriented differentiation 
between law and morality. As such, even though they had but little 
respect for the existence of triple talak, they nevertheless upheld its 
validity, provided it followed the correct pronouncement.25 
The position was apparently definitely settled in 1905 by Batchelor 
J. in Bombay for who triple talak was "good law, though bad in theo-
logy."26 Justices Munro and Abdur Rahim would later follow the same 
reasoning in Madras: 
No doubt an arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of the right to dis-
solve the marriage is strongly condemned in the Koran and in the 
reported sayings of the Prophet (Hadith) and is treated as a spiri-
tual offence. But the impropriety of the husband’s conduct would 
in no way affect the legal validity of a divorce duly effected by the 
husband.27 
For a very long time this will be the set position, sustained well after 
India’s independence, enshrining the husband’s extraordinary divorce 
powers: 
The only condition necessary for the valid exercise of the right of 
divorce by the husband is that he must be a major and of sound 
mind at that time. He can effect divorce whenever he desires. 
Even if he divorces his wife under compulsion, or in jest, or in 
anger that is considered perfectly valid. No special form is neces-
 



































sary for effecting divorce under Hanafi law (…) the husband can 
effect it conveying to the wife that he is repudiating the alliance. 
It need not even be addressed to her. It takes effect the moment 
it comes to her knowledge.28 
High Courts have even dismissed harshly any attempt to interpret Isla-
mic primary sources, strongly emphasising the difference between the 
role of a judge (as a mukallid─follower) with one of a mudjtahid (inter-
preter): "However learned the Tehlsidar Magistrate [whose decision is 
appealed] may be in theology, he should have known that he was 
acting as a Judicial Officer, and it was not for him as such Officer to 
give his own interpretations of the verses of the holy Quran."29 
The judiciary thus seemed to have imprisoned itself within a fixed 
set of Islamic legal sources, which had been merged with Indian Mus-
lim Personal Law—then known as Anglo-Muhammadan Law—textbooks 
around the beginning of the twentieth century (Mulla 1990; Ali 1985; 
Fyzee 2008), the latter only accentuating the 'fossilisation' effect as 
being both Islamically authoritative and having the force of stare deci-
sis. 
Muslim personal law and the Constitution 
The Constitution of India brought about significant changes to the 
Indian legal frame, especially in its emphasis on fundamental rights 
(Part III) such as the one to equality (art. 14) and to life (art. 21), 
whilst preserving freedom of religion (art. 25) and the right for a 
religious denomination to manage its religious affairs in accordance 
with its law (art. 26). Moreover, although not directly enforceable, it 
disposes of a number of Directive Principles of State Policy (Part IV), 
not least of which the one to "secure for the citizens a uniform civil 
code throughout the territory of India" (art. 44). Therefore, the first 
question the judiciary had to face was to assess if personal laws were 
subjected to these fundamental rights, or would they be an integral 
part of the latter. 
Indeed, it seems evident that triple talak contravenes to a certain 
number of constitutional provisions. However, from a very early stage 
the judiciary decided on the non-applicability of Part III of the Consti-
tution to personal laws, specifically under art. 13 (1) which, even if it 
disposes that all laws in force and inconsistent with the Constitution 
would be void, is followed by art. 13 (3) (b) which goes on the define 
 



































"laws in force" as statutory provisions, which at the time was not the 
case of most personal laws, as they remained uncodified.30 
Moreover, the "endeavour to secure" a uniform civil code, soon to 
be qualified as more of a legal process than an actual legal object31, 
has also bumped on the right to freedom of religion and the specific 
divine character of Muslim personal law in that regard: 
Article 44 seeks to divest religion from social relations and perso-
nal law. Marriage, succession and like matters of a secular chara-
cter cannot be brought within the guarantees enshrined under 
article 25, 26 and 27. The personal law of the Hindus, such as 
relating to marriage succession and the like have all a sacramen-
tal origin, in the same manner as in the case of the Muslims or 
the Christians. The Hindus along with Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains 
have forsaken their sentiments in the cause of the national unity 
and integration, some other communities would not, though the 
Constitution enjoins establishment of a "common civil code" for 
the whole of India.32 
Subsequently, the higher judiciary consistently refused to entertain 
challenges to Muslim personal law based on Part III of the Constitu-
tion33, although some lower courts have continued to entertain the 
idea, perhaps thrilled by the possibilities opened up by Public Interest 
Litigation in the 1970s, such as in an un-reported case where Judge 
Rajender Kumar writes in an obiter dictum: 
Right to sustain i.e. life [art. 21 of the Constitution] is a fun-
damental right of a person. It is such right, which cannot be 
taken away through an agreement. To be more explicit, a person 
cannot agree to be killed by entering into a contract. To have sex 
and procreate children, which are described by Mullah as "objects 
of Mahomaden Marriage", are essence of life as fundamental as 
life itself. (…) Moreover, a marriage gives birth to certain rights 
and liabilities, which are seldom described in the contract of mar-
riage i.e. Nikahnama. If Nikah was an ordinary Civil Contract, a 
spouse could not have claimed maintenance or right in property 
of other spouse, having not been mentioned in Nikahnama. In 
this way, it will not be proper to describe a Mohamaden Marriage, 
a civil contract.34 
Hence, having bound itself to Muslim personal law textbooks, the only 
option left to influence the legal outcome of a Muslim marriage seemed 
to extract it from the realm of religion. If simply a civil contract, then it 
becomes secular and the state can regulate it (art. 25 (2) (a) of the 
Constitution)35, or else (as Judge Rajender Kumar seems to advocate) 
it can also be considered as a purely social institution. In the latter 
 



































case, a Muslim marriage would fall back in the category of custom—
unless otherwise codified—which would make it liable to the constitu-
tional provisions of Part III.36  
As the law stood however, the religious aspect of marriage was en-
shrined in the 1937 Act, which moreover defines the scope and nature 
of Muslim personal law. As such, any evolution of the latter necessarily 
needed to spring from within the Islamic legal frame itself. The 
struggle was now for the judiciary to break the walls it had entombed 
itself in. A task rendered even more perilous due to the fact that triple 
talak is hardly the object of a case put before a Court, but usually a 
superfluous argument within maintenance litigation. As such, judges 
can only tackle the issue within obiter dictums whose binding force 
remain contentious.    
Circumventing the 'fossilisation' of Muslim law 
Paradoxically however the use of obiter dictums, precisely due to their 
nature as 'opinions', has allowed the judiciary more leeway in interpre-
ting Muslim personal law. As aforementioned, most cases involving 
triple talak are maintenance cases. The classic defence of the husband, 
whose wife claimed maintenance, revolved around the argument that 
he had already divorced her and subsequently she could not be gran-
ted any alimony beyond the ῾idda period (corresponding to three lunar 
months, except if the woman is pregnant, in which case the period 
extends until birth); Rationes decidendi in such instances centred on 
technicalities, especially the lack of communication to the wife, there-
fore prolonging her right to maintenance while at the same time not 
directly contravening to a precedent.37 Judges will often touch upon 
the validity of triple talak as a secondary issue, but will be careful not 
to base their decision on it. Notwithstanding, the Gordian knot remai-
ned around the role of the judge as a mukallid, as one who could not 
interpret freely Islamic primary sources; thus different techniques 
were put in place to circumvent the problem. 
Blame the British 
The first step was to blame the British through their selective sources 
of Islamic textbooks, which would not represent the plurality of the 
Indian Muslim community, whilst giving biased and un-authentic ver-
sions of the kurʾan and teachings of the Prophet. Justice Iyer will be at 
the forefront of such re-evaluation: 
 



































Since infallibility is not an attribute of the judiciary, the view has 
been ventured by Muslim jurists that the Indo-Anglian judicial 
exposition of the Islamic law of divorce has not exactly been just 
to the Holy Prophet or the Holy Book. Marginal distortions are ine-
vitable when the Judicial committee in Downing Street has to 
interpret Manu and Muhammad of India and Arabia. The soul of a 
culture—law is largely the formalized and enforceable expression 
of a community’s cultural norms—cannot be fully understood by 
alien minds. The view that the Muslim husband enjoys arbitrary, 
unilateral power to inflict divorce does not accord with Islamic 
injunctions.38 
However, the judge will not go as far as to re-interpret Islamic law by 
himself, but will rely on other Muslim authorities in order to qualify a 
Muslim marriage as a civil contract.39 Iyer J. will not directly invalidate 
triple talak, but will balance it by recognising to the wife a similar right 
to divorce through khulʿ40, therefore respecting the classical notion of 
equal bargaining powers in the formation of a contract.41 
The view I have accepted has one of the great advantage in that 
the Muslim woman (like any other woman) comes back into her 
own when the Prophet’s words are fulfilled, when roughly equal 
rights are enjoyed by both spouses, when the talaq technique of 
instant divorce is matched somewhat by the Khulaa device of 
delayed dissolution operated under judicial supervision. The social 
imbalance between the sexes will thus be removed and the inar-
ticulate major premise of equal justice realised.42 
The problem of such a definition of marriage is that it faces the risk, 
under civil contractual rules, to invalidate the marriage contract alto-
gether as Nikah nama tend to usually be extremely vague.43 
Blurring the lines between law and morality 
Following judgments will henceforth moderate the strict civil qualifica-
tion given to a Muslim marriage contract, adding to it a religious 
dimension. 
Though marriage under the Muslim Law is only a civil contract, 
yet the rights and responsibilities consequent upon it are of such 
importance to the welfare of humanity, that a high degree of 
sanctity is attached to it. But in spite of the sacredness of the 
character of the marriage tie, Islam recognizes the necessity, in 
exceptional circumstances, of keeping the way open for its dis-
solution.44        
 



































Justice Baharul Islam will directly use Islamic principles to temper the 
right of triple talak, whilst not completely abolishing it. "Talaq shall be 
for a good cause and must not be at the mere desire, sweet will, whim 
and caprice of husband and shall not be secret."45 
In both cases, the divorce will not be recognised based on technical 
grounds—mainly due to the lack of evidence or the fact that the deed 
of divorce did not explicitly mention the nature of talak in its triple 
form, therefore falling under the conditions of the revocable one 
(radjʿi). 
Most interestingly however, Justice Baharul Islam will start to direct-
ly tackle and interpret the kurʾan (K 4: 128-9; 4: 229-32 and most 
notably 4: 35 on the prerequisite of arbitration), albeit through the 
prism of well-established authorities. In contradiction to the previous 
rulings distinguishing between law and moral, he ventures into apply-
ing Islamic injunctions in accordance with broader Islamic principles in 
order to advance a first pre-requisite to the validity of triple talak: a 
reasonable cause.  
The use of Islamic principles to justify the non-recognition of triple 
talak will continue to be used, adding more and more conditions along 
the way.46 Nevertheless, this evolution of Muslim Law remained greatly 
divisive and High Courts were far from having reached a consensus on 
the issue.47 The Shamim Ara decision48 in 2002 seemed at first to have 
quelled such tensions. Again, through an obiter dictum49 the Supreme 
Court gave its opinion as to the correct procedure relating to a Muslim 
divorce, which would require a reasonable cause and an attempt at 
arbitration with relevant family members of each spouse in order for it 
to be valid. Drawing from previous judgments, it departed from the 
misleading British interpretation, wrongly used as precedents by text-
books (including Mulla 1990) and re-iterated the argument that Muslim 
personal law must be interpreted in concordance with broader Islamic 
moral principles. 
One can however notice that the legal reasoning behind such a stan-
ce underlines a complete reversal from previous decisions regarding 
the nature of Muslim personal law within the Indian legal frame. 
Indeed, following Danial Latifi’s footsteps personal law is no longer 
applicable because it is the legal translation of a fundamental right50, 
but because through its inherent religious principles, Muslim law 'is' by 
essence in accordance with fundamental rights. Just as "when a consti-
tutional provision is interpreted, the cardinal rule is to look to the 
Preamble to the Constitution as the guiding star and the Directive Prin-
 



































ciples of State Policy as the 'Book of Interpretation'"51, it will now be 
necessary for every Islamic legal injunction to be assessed in con-
formity with Islamic primary sources, and even more broadly Islam’s 
moral ethos.  
The reasoning underlying the shift operated in Danial Latifi in 2001 
is very similar to the one grounding the 'basic structure' doctrine with-
in Indian Constitutional Law initiated in the 1970s.52 In the same man-
ner, the kurʾan has become the 'guiding star' that will allow innovation 
within long standing Islamic legal provisions, following another predi-
cament by Justice Iyer: "Law is dynamic and its meaning cannot be 
pedantic but purposeful."53 
Danial Latifi operates an alteration, albeit subtle, from the traditional 
syllogistic reasoning from personal law as a fundamental right, to fun-
damental rights being entrenched within personal laws—if not, it is 
because the latter have been necessarily misinterpreted. 
In interpreting the provisions where matrimonial relationship is 
involved, we have to consider the social conditions prevalent in 
our society. In our society, whether they belong to the majority 
or the minority group, what is apparent is that there exists a 
great disparity in the matter of economic resourcefulness between 
a man and a woman. Our society is male dominated, both eco-
nomically and socially and women are assigned, invariably, a 
dependent role, irrespective of the class of society to which she 
belongs.54 
This passage would entail the enforcement of the right to equality (art. 
14), unless trumped by the competing one of freedom of religion (art. 
25 and 26), hence the aforementioned legal dead-end the judiciary 
previously faced. However, this is no longer an issue since: 
It is popularly said that a Muslim marriage is nothing but a civil 
contract and a large section believes that the husband has an 
absolute freedom to dissolve the marriage without assigning rea-
sons and at his free will. The Holy Quran as well as other sources 
of Personal Law teach us that the process of reaching to the mari-
tal tie is certainly a civil contract, but once the marriage is solem-
nised it becomes an institution life long for both husband and the 
wife and they do not live together by way of a mere contract but 
in a holy and sacred bond of love, care and mutual respect with 
equal status to both partners.55 
One can sense however the irony consisting on one hand to cast aside 
the British heritage on the grounds of a biased application of Islamic 
sources, while on the other to do exactly the same, this time based on 
 



































a constitutional theory, which at least is not 'alien' to India—Islamic 
law having in both instances but little say in the matter. 
Notwithstanding, in extending the enforceability of 'principles', which 
by nature are more directives than precise rules, the Indian judiciary 
may fall into another irony pointed by Pratab Bhanu Mehta concerning 
PIL, as he remarks:  
[E]ven as the Supreme Court has established itself as a forum for 
resolving public-policy problems, the principles informing its 
actions have become less clear. To the extent that the rule of law 
means making available a forum for appeals, one can argue that 
the Court has done a decent job. To the extent that the rule of 
law means articulating a coherent public philosophy that produces 
predictable results, the Court’s interventions look less impressive. 
(Mehta 2007: 72) 
Shamim Ara is no exception to this, quite the contrary. 
Shamim Ara’s aftermath 
Shamim Ara, although laying forward a standard procedure relating to 
Muslim divorce, does not explicitly abrogate triple talak, and left a 
number of issues un-resolved. If arbitration were to take place before 
any pronouncement of talak, would a subsequent triple one be valid? 
Is Muslim marriage a religious institution or a civil contract to begin 
with, is it both? But then, which rules governing each field would take 
precedence over the other in case of conflict? What is the test to 
assess a 'reasonable cause'?56 Is an obiter even binding? Etc…  
As such, High Courts remain divided on the issue of triple talak, 
whilst some considering the obiter dictum of Shamim Ara to be binding 
have followed its solution; they were however forced to interpret its 
gaps. In Kunhimohammed v. Ayishakutty57 Justice Basant whilst prai-
sing the Supreme Court’s decision as "a declaration of law [that] 
rhymes well with modern notions of marriage and the true Islamic con-
cepts of marriage and divorce" which are as such consistent with "the 
human right to life recognized under article 21. [And] rhyme well with 
the concepts of equality under article 14 of the Constitution", is never-
theless forced to qualify as an implied 'reasonable cause' a failed 
mediation or the refusal of the wife (or her family) to participate, 
adding: "We do note that Shamim Ara (…) throws up several interes-
ting questions and those will have to be tackled. If legislature does not 
intervene and make stipulations, we may have to wait for bridges to 
 



































cross the rivers. Judicial innovations may become necessary and una-
voidable to build such bridges" (ibid.). 
Judicial innovation has already begun however, as certain High 
Courts have felt free under 'true' Islamic principles to read Shamim 
Ara as transforming triple talak into a single revocable one58, whilst 
cherry picking different dispositions within the All India Muslim Per-
sonal Law Board’s (AIMPLB)59 attempted codification of Muslim law.60 
Notwithstanding, other High Courts have considered Shamim Ara 
not to be binding to the point of not recognising the existence of a 
'reasonable cause' as a necessary condition of divorce, such as the 
High Court of Uttarakhand: "once pronouncement of divorce is made 
by husband in conscious condition, its validity cannot be challenged."61        
The influence of the J&K High Court, a way forward? 
As it comes to legal reasoning in regards to Muslim personal law, the 
pattern followed by the High Court of J&K cannot yet be qualified as 
consistent. Indeed, some decisions continue to follow the Supreme 
Court’s lead (and indecision), in line with the rest of the country.62 
However, a recent decision from Justice Massodi hints at a possible 
evolution63, and might change the way Muslim personal law will be 
applied in the future. Indeed, whilst up-holding the Shamim Ara solu-
tion of reasonable cause and necessary arbitration before any Muslim 
divorce is effective; the legal argumentation is significantly different 
and answers a number of questions that had been left open for inter-
pretation. 
An Islamic legal reasoning applied to an Islamic legal issue 
The first perceived change is the complete lack of external sources 
used to ground Justice Massodi’s decision. Indeed, apart from a refe-
rence to some Supreme Court decisions on the nature of marriage—
which only serve to re-iterate J&K’s increasing incorporation into the 
Indian legal frame—the judgment does not refer to any textbooks, 
legal precedents or other authorities on the matter of triple talak. 
Hence, whilst conceding alongside the Supreme Court’s indecisive 
stance that marriage is a social institution (contract) however based on 
a 'sacred ceremony'64, Massodi J. will precisely qualify it within the 
Muslim legal frame as a 'solemn covenant' falling under ʿibadat  (rules 
pertaining the to the relationship between believer and God) rather 
than muʿamalat (social relations), therefore forgoing previous attempts 
 



































to define it in purely civil terms, but falling completely within the appli-
cation of Muslim personal law due to its religious/ritualistic nature.  
Subsequently the decision will ground itself on the judge’s own 
interpretation of Islamic law, using both primary sources (kurʾan and 
hadith), as well as secondary ones (idjmaʿ, kiyas, and idjtihad): 
The primary sources of Shariat Law are Quran, Sunna-practice 
and sayings of the Prophet. Ijma, Qiyas and Ijtihaad supplement 
the primary sources. To find out the answer to the question, and 
manner in which the marriage may be dissolved or the marriage 
contract come to an end, we have to go to the fundamental sour-
ces of Shariat Law and to understand the concept of marriage in 
Islam, the rights of the parties to the marriage contract. 
This is a radical change from the strict separation the same Court ope-
rated in 195565, as it seems now the judicial officer has a duty to 
tackle Islamic law as a mudjtahid rather than a mukallid. In doing so, 
Justice Massodi will use philology in his reading of the verses relating 
to marriage (K 30: 21) and the gender indeterminacy of zawdj to state 
an equal partnership between the spouses within marriage. Based on K 
2:229 under which "a divorce is pronounced twice", he will further 
infer that a divorce is 'only' pronounced twice, hence: "Talaaki bid’i is a 
later innovation and does not find approval of Shariat Law. It is a 
medicine that was conceived to cure the menace of multiple divorces 
at one time, but turned out to be more lethal than the disease it was 
to cure." 
To determine that the husband’s right to divorce is not absolute, he 
also grounds his opinion on a series of hadith, notably quoted by 
Djaʿfar al-sadik (d. 765), who whilst being considered as an authority 
by Sunnis is also the sixth Imam of the Shia; the latter not recognising 
triple talak, one could speculate that this choice is not hazardous, and 
might be leading to talfik (mixing of legal doctrines). Hence he will 
conclude that arbitration is in all cases compulsory for a divorce to be 
effective. Furthermore, he will emphasise the role of such arbitration, 
differentiating it from mediation: 
The verdict whatever given by the two arbiters is expected to be 
followed by the spouses. It is pertinent to mention that Quran 
uses the word "Hakm" or "arbiter" and not "mediator". The 
arbiters therefore, have not to simply mediate but to give their 
verdict so as to redress the grievances, and such verdict is expec-
ted to be followed by the spouses. 
 



































He will then use analogy (kiyas) to consider as a condition of validity 
the presence of two witnesses, based on the procedure laid down for 
revocable talak in its 'pure' form (ahsan) under K 65: 1-2. 
There is no scope for disagreement with the legal proposition that 
the Quran and Sunna refer to Talaak ahsan, restrictions placed on 
use of the said device, as laid down in Chapter 65 verse 1 and 2 
and elsewhere in the Quran and Sunna have reference to Talaak 
ahsan. However, there is no reason to conclude that the said 
restrictions applicable to the most approved form of divorce, 
should not be applicable to the most despised and discouraged 
form of Talaak i.e. Talaak bid’i. On the other hand, restrictions 
warrant strict enforcement in case of Talaak bid’i.    
Justice Massodi, whilst not de jure invalidating triple talak, renders it 
de facto ineffective by adding a list of compulsory steps in order for a 
Muslim divorce to be effective: 
a. Pre-divorce arbitration with representatives of both spou-
ses’ respective families. 
b. A valid reason must be put forward (and proved). 
c. Subsequent divorce must be pronounced in the presence 
of two witnesses ('endued with justice'). 
d. The pronouncement must be made during the period of 
tuhr (between menstrual cycles). 
The decision is not far from the solution of the Masroor Ahmed case66, 
what is significant however is the legal rationale, which springs from 
Islamic law’s internal reasoning, and is therefore less prone to the fre-
quent accusations of being tainted by secular legal injunctions. 
J&K’s unique position in reforming Muslim personal law from within 
Justice Massodi’s legal argumentation can however be critiqued within 
the Islamic legal frame itself—as to be fair any decision based on Isla-
mic law. Notwithstanding, the significance of this judgement lies in the 
fact that a judicial body has fully grasped the interpretation and appli-
cation of Muslim personal law, allying two distinctive authorities: that 
of the Muslim scholar or kadi and that of the judicial officer of the 
State. 
Whilst the Indian judiciary has for the most part tiptoed around Isla-
mic legal issues: relying heavily on contradicting authorities, trying to 
separate certain fields from the realm of Muslim personal law to incor-
porate them into the civil sphere, or put forward broad Islamic moral 
 



































principles to include the former into constitutional provisions, this deci-
sion seems to follow a different path. Although moving towards similar 
goals, its distinctiveness lies in the argumentation put forward, more 
likely to appeal to a Muslim minority weary of Hindu majority state 
interventions, whilst having the potential to combine two conflicting 
sovereignties: that of God and that of the secular Nation State. 
J&K is in a unique position to achieve such an agenda due to several 
particularities it holds within the Indian Union. As aforementioned, it is 
the most important state with a Muslim majority—moreover diverse 
with a strong tradition of Sufism and a significant Shia minority, which 
render the use of talfik more legitimate as a representative and unify-
ing tool. Muslim non-governmental organisation such as the AIMPLB 
are also absent from the state, making the social pressure to push 
towards a non-State defined Islamic law less prevalent. The enactment 
of the J&K Muslim Personal Law (Shariat Application) Act, 2007 follows 
also a different objective than the central one of 1937: Whilst the lat-
ter translated the 'hand off' approach advocated by the British colonial 
authorities, leading to a certain level of legal insecurity (or at least, 
indeterminacy), the former is the result of an appeal from the judiciary 
for more legal security as Justice Imtiyaz Hussain made clear in 2004: 
(…) customary law prevalent in the State has resulted in chaos 
and often gives rise to endless litigation and causes delay in the 
disposal of cases. (…) The Court67 suggested that the legislature 
of the State should take an early opportunity of clearly expressing 
itself by means of proper enactment, whether in matters relating 
to succession and other matters which came up before the court 
of law from day to day Personal Law of the parties should be 
made applicable or custom and if so what should be that custom 
in a particular matter. (…) [S]ince the problem is a persisting one, 
it is the high time the Legislature of the State take note of the 
suggestions of the Full Court.68 
The subsequent choice by the State legislature to favour Muslim perso-
nal law over customary law has enticed the judiciary to be more pre-
cise and foreseeable in their rulings over Islamic legal issues, whilst 
also giving it the tools to compete with un-official Muslim adjudicative 
bodies such as the Darul-Qazas (non-governmental Muslim arbitration 
tribunals), whereas the stance taken by the Indian central state is 
more accommodating in considering these structures as parallel arbi-
tration (yet non adjudicative) bodies, necessary to avoid an over-flow 
of cases towards the State judicial system.69 
 




































Some thirty years down the line, Tahir Mahmood’s call for both reform 
within Muslim personal law and J&K’s role to be at the forefront of such 
venture seems to have begun to materialise (Mahmood 1981). Yet, it 
remains uncertain as to its sustainability in the future: whether such 
change in legal reasoning will or even can spread outside J&K. As this 
article has sought to show, the question of triple talak is at a judicial 
cross road, and with it the legal grounding upon which Muslim Personal 
Law is to be administered within India.  
The recent Shayara Bano petition exemplifies both avenues upon 
which the Supreme Court could potentially decide on its reform and/or 
unconstitutionality. Indeed, whilst the bulk of the petition asks for 
triple talak (and more generally the issues of marriage and divorce) to 
be considered outside the purview of religious precepts, and thus ame-
nable to fundamental rights provisions, it also leaves the possibility for 
it to be declared void on sole Islamic legal grounds.  
These two avenues do not have the same legal consequences how-
ever. On the one hand, to qualify Muslim marriages and divorce as non 
-essentially religious would leave but little—if any—effectiveness to the 
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and de facto 
create a judicial Uniform Civil Code. On the other hand, to follow the 
lead of the J&K High Court—and of other Muslim majority states—in 
declaring triple talak un-Islamic and therefore unconstitutional would 
be opening the door to further interpretation of Islamic law, something 
the judiciary has be weary of doing ever since the Shah Bano contro-
versy. Finally, not to choose a particular legal grounding and declaring 
triple talak to be both un-Islamic and unconstitutional without indica-
ting a clear hierarchical relation between the two, as a recent judge-
ment from the Armed Forces Tribunal has chosen to do70, would only 
pave the way to more legal uncertainty in the future… something a 
Supreme Court is normally created to avoid. 
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'Sharia Project' (jointly organised by the University of Exeter and Leiden University) in 2013 and 
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